#### CS 594 Modern Reinforcement Learning

Lecture 5: MARL and MCTS


#### Announcements

HW2 Released

Resources being added to course website

### **Markov Decision Processes**

- Trajectory S<sub>0</sub>, A<sub>0</sub>, R<sub>0</sub>, S<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>1</sub>, R<sub>1</sub>, ...
- A (finite) MDP is defined by:
  - A finite set of states s ∈ S
  - A finite set of actions a ∈ A
  - A finite set of rewards  $r \in R$
  - Dynamics  $p(s',r|s,a) = Pr(S_t=s',R_t=r|S_{t-1}=s,A_{t-1}=a)$
  - Discount Rate γ
  - Possibly start state (distribution), terminal state
- Derived Quantities:
  - State transition probabilities  $p(s'|s,a) = Pr(S_t=s'|S_{t-1}=s,A_{t-1}=a) = \Sigma_{r \in R} p(s',r|s,a)$
  - Expected rewards  $r(s,a) = E[R_t | S_{t-1} = s, A_{t-1} = a] = \sum_{r \in R} r \sum_{s' \in S} p(s', r | s, a)$
  - Or  $r(s,a,s') = E[R_t | S_{t-1} = s, A_{t-1} = a, S_t = s'] = \sum_{r \in R} r p(s', r | s, a) / p(s' | s, a)$



#### Markov Games (a.k.a. Stochastic Games)

- A finite set of players  $i \in N$
- A finite set of states  $s \in S$
- A finite set of actions for each player a<sub>i</sub> ∈ A<sub>i</sub>
- A finite set of rewards  $r \in R$
- Dynamics p(s',r<sub>1</sub>,...,r<sub>n</sub>|s, a<sub>1</sub>,...,a<sub>n</sub>)

#### Independent Q-learning

• 
$$q(s,a) = q(s,a) + \alpha \left( r + \gamma \max_{a''} [q(s',a'')] - q(s,a) \right)$$

What might go wrong?

Environment is non-stationary

# Joint Q-learning

- $q_i(s, a_1, a_2) = q_i(s, a_1, a_2) + \alpha (r_i + v_i(s') q_i(s, a_1a_2))$
- How should we compute  $v_i(s')$ ?

- Special case:  $r_2 = -r_1$ 
  - "Zero Sum"

• Implies  $v_2 = -v_1$  and  $q_2 = -q_1$ 

#### Min-Max-Q

Player 1 wants to maximize  $q_1$ , player 2 wants to minimize it

#### von Neumann Minimax Theorem:

• 
$$v_*(s) = \max_{\pi_1(s)} \min_{\pi_2(s)} q_1(s, \pi_1(s), \pi_2(s)) = \min_{\pi_2(s)} \max_{\pi_1(s)} q_1(s, \pi_1(s), \pi_2(s))$$

• 
$$q_1(s, a_1, a_2) = q_1(s, a_1, a_2) + \alpha \left( r_i + \max_{\pi_1} \min_{a_2} q_1(s, a_1, a_2) - q_1(s, a_1a_2) \right)$$

Converges under Robbins Munro conditions!

# Nash-Q

•  $q_i(s, a_1, a_2) = q_i(s, a_1, a_2) + \alpha (r_i + v_i(s') - q_i(s, a_1a_2))$ 

• 
$$v_i(s') = E_{\pi_1,\pi_2}[q_i(s', a_1', a_2')]$$

Need a way of predicting what the other player will do

• Compute an equilibrium

Converges under more complex conditions

#### **Three Learning Settings**

Planning with known dynamics

Reinforcement Learning

- Simulation
- With simulator, can reset and "roll out" repeatedly from a state

## **Rollout Algorithms**

• I am in state s and have a policy  $\pi$ . What should I do?

• Want to learn something smarter than just  $\pi(s)$ 

• Idea: estimate  $q_{\pi}(s, a)$  via Monte Carlo

Intuitively converges via Policy Improvement Theorem!

#### **Rollout Algorithms**

#### **Rollout Algorithms**

#### Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)

Repeat until bored:

- 1) Selection: Use current estimates to choose a leaf of tree policy
- 2) Expansion: (Optional) add children of leaf to the tree policy
- 3) Simulation: Roll out from (new) leaf
- 4) Backup: Update all relevant MC estimates based on return

#### Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)

#### Multi-agent Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)

# Summary

- MARL Need to predict actions of others
  - Not too hard in two-player, zero-sum settings
  - Tricky in general
- Rollouts
  - Use Monte Carlo estimates for policy improvement
  - Can focus search (MCTS)
  - Works even with multiple agents